

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 OIC-04 DRC-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 EUR-25 PM-07

INR-10 L-03 NEA-10 NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03

USIA-15 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 SS-20 NSC-10 H-03 IO-14 AEC-11

AECE-00 OMB-01 EB-11 /175 W  
----- 077153

P R 081728Z DEC 73

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 909

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 VIENNA 10119

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: DRAFT OF PRESENTATION FOR 11 DECEMBER  
PLENARY

ANKARA FOR DELIVERY TO NATO DEPARTMENT TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTRY

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS FROM U.S. REP MBFR

AT 7 DECEMBER AHG MEETING FRG REP BEHREND'S CIRCULATED  
ENGLISH DRAFT VERSION OF PRESENTATION TO BE DELIVERED BY  
HIM AT DEC 11 PLENARY. AHG APPROVED DRAFT WITH EXCEPTION  
OB BRACKETED LAST SENTENCE IN PAR 8, IN LIGHT OF ITALIAN  
DEP REP OBJECTION TO INCLUSION OF REFERENCE TO HUNGARY  
QUESTION. AHG AGREED TO SEEK BACKGROUND ON THIS POINT  
FROM SECRETARY GENERAL'S OFFICE. IN RESPONSE TO  
DEPARTMENT'S INSTRUCTION IN STATE 240801, WE WILL  
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SECURE DELETION OF LAST SENTENCE IN PARA 16 AND SECOND

TO LAST SENTENCE OF PARA 20.

BEGIN TEXT.

SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS, AMBASSADOR DUHR ON DECEMBER 5 COMMENTED EXTENSIVELY ON THE FIRST FIVE PARAGRAPHS OF THE WESTERN OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS. TODAY I SHOULD LIKE TO CONTINUE THE DETAILED ELABORATION OF THE CONTENTS OF THE PROPOSALS WHICH WE TABLED ON NOVEMBER 22. I SHALL ADDRESS PARAGRAPH 6 ON REDUCTIONS IN SOVIET GROUND FORCES, PARAGRAPH 7 ON REDUCTIONS IN UNITED STATES GROUND FORCES, PARAGRAPH 8 ON OTHER SECURITY ASPECTS ARISING FROM REDUCTIONS, PARAGRAPH 9 ON ASSOCIATED MEASURES AND A PARAGRAPH 10 ON PROVISIONS FOR A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS. WE HOPE IN THIS WAY TO PLACE YOU IN A POSITION TO APPRECIATE FULLY THAT OUR PROPOSALS ARE DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE WHAT ALL PARTICIPANTS SET OUT TO DO: TO ENHANCE STABILITY AND TO STRENGTHEN SECURITY EFFECTIVELY BY BRINGING ABOUT A SITUATION IN WHICH ALL PARTICIPANTS WOULD FEEL MORE SECURE.

YOU WILL REMEMBER THAT PARAGRAPH 5 OF THE WESTERN OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS CALLS FOR REDUCTIONS IN THE FIRST PHASE OF GROUND FORCES OF THE SOVIET UNION AND UNITED STATES. AMBASSADOR DUHR EXPLAINED WHY IT WAS APPROPRIATE AND DESIRABLE TO START WITH REDUCTIONS IN SOVIET AND UNITED STATES GROUND FORCES AND WHY THIS APPROACH TO THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE AND DIRECT WAY TO REACH AGREEMENT. PARAGRAPH 6 AND 7 OF OUR PROPOSALS SPECIFY WHAT THE APPROPRIATE REDUCTIONS IN THE GROUND FORCES OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE.

PARAGRAPH 6 PROPOSES THAT THE SOVIET UNION WITHDRAW A TANK ARMY CONSISTING OF 5 DIVISIONS FROM THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. IT STATES HOW MANY MEN, TANKS AND DIVISIONS ARE INVOLVED, THUS IDENTIFYING A SOVIET TANK ARMY STATIONED IN THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC. THE USSR WOULD WITHDRAW SOME 68,000 SOLDIERS AND 1,700 MAIN BATTLE TANKS. THIS WOULD BE ABOUT 15 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL SOVIET GROUND FORCES OF 460,000 SOLDIERS IN THE AREA OF REDUCTION. THIS DEGREE OF PRECISION IS IMPORTANT TO ASSURE THAT THERE WILL BE CLARITY ON BASIC POINTS IN A FUTURE AGREEMENT. SUCH PROVISIONS ARE NOT, IN OUR VIEW, SOMETHING WHICH SHOULD BE RELEGATED TO AN ANNEX.

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THE WITHDRAWAL OF ONE COMPLETE SOVIET TANK ARMY WOULD BE A LOGICAL FIRST-PHASE REDUCTION THE EASTERN SIDE. AS WESTERN STATEMENTS HAVE POINTED OUT, THERE IS A MAJOR DISPROPORTION IN TANK STRENGTHS BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. IN THIS AREA THE EAST HAS 15,500 MAIN BATTLE TANKS IN ACTIVE UNITS, THE WEST ONLY 6,000. THIS IS ONE OF THE IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES IN GROUND FORCE STRENGTHS ON THE TWO SIDES WHICH HAVE

TO BE DEALT WITH. THE WITDRAWAL OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY WOULD NOT ELIMINATE THE DIFFERENCE IN TANKS BUT WOULD REDUCE IT. DIMINISHING THAT DIFFERENCE WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT STEP TO ENHANCING STABILITY.

PARAGRAPH 7 PROPOSES THAT THE UNITED STATES WITHDRAW FROM THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS ABOUT 15 PERCENT OF ITS GROUND FORCE MANPOWER OR ABOUT 29,000 SOLDIERS, THAT IS THE SAME PROPORTION OF MANPOWER AS THE SOVIET UNION WOULD WITHDRAW. UNITED STATES SOLDIERS WOULD BE WITHDRAWN AS INDIVIDUALS OR IN UNITS AND THEIR EQUIPMENT COULD BE STORED IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. THESE PROVISIONS WOULD HELP TO OFFSET THE EFFECTS OF GEOGRAPHY WHICH FAVOR THE SOVIET UNION. IN ADDITION TO REDUCING THE MARKED DIFFERENCE IN TANK STRENGTHS BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES, THE PROPOSED REDUCTIONS WOULD ALSO NARROW THE OVERALL DISPARITY IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES, AND WOULD THUS BE AN INITIAL STEP TOWARD ACHIEVEMENT OF A COMMON CEILING IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AGREED AREA.

THE WESTERN APPROACH THUS INCLUDES PROVISIONS WHICH TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE BASIC DIFFERENCES IN SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF FORCES AND IN GEOGRAPHY IN A WAY WHICH WILL RESULT IN A MORE STABLE MILITARY RELATIONSHIP IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THE EASTERN PROPOSALS ARE, IN OUR VIEW, DEFICIENT IN THAT THEY FAIL TO COME TO GRIPS WITH THE PROBLEMS CAUSED BY THESE DIFFERENCES.

IT IS THE AGREED AIM OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS THAT THEY SHOULD ENHANCE STABILITY AND STRENGTHEN SECURITY IN EUROPE. BOTH SIDES HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT THEY WISH TO SAFEGUARD THE SECURITY OF OTHER COUNTRIES IN EUROPE. THE WESTERN PROPOSALS,

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 OIC-04 DRC-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 EUR-25 PM-07

INR-10 L-03 NEA-10 NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03

USIA-15 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 SS-20 NSC-10 H-03 IO-14 AEC-11

AECE-00 OMB-01 EB-11 /175 W  
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P R 081728Z DEC 73  
FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 910  
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY  
INFO USMISSION NATO  
AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USNMR SHAPE  
USCINCEUR

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HOWEVER, ARE MORE SPECIFIC IN TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE SPECIAL PARTICIPANTS. PARAGRAPH 8 STATES THAT IN ANY AGREEMENT REACHED, THE WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES FROM THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS SHOULD NOT DIMINISH THE SECURITY OF THE COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING WITH SPECIAL STATUS. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT FORCE WITHDRAWALS COULD BE CARRIED OUT IN A WAY WHICH WOULD HAVE A DESTABILIZING EFFECT IN EUROPE OUTSIDE THE AGREED AREA OF REDUCTIONS. IT WOULD BE INCONSISTENT WITH THE AGREED CRITERION OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY IF THE RESULT OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS WERE SIMPLY TO SHIFT MILITARY CONCENTRATION FROM CENTRAL EUROPE TO OTHER PARTS OF THE CONTINENT.

IT WAS CLEARLY RECOGNIZED IN THE 28 JUNE COMMUNIQUE THAT ASSOCIATED MEASURES WOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS. TO APPROACH REDUCTIONS WITH DUE REGARD TO THEIR POSSIBLE REPERCUSSIONS ON THE RESULTING SECURITY SITUATION REQUIRES THAT WE SHOULD SUPPLEMENT REDUCTIONS WITH CONFIDENTIAL

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ASSOCIATED MEASURES CONCERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF FORCES, INCLUDING PROVISIONS FOR STABILIZING MEASURES, FOR THE APPROPRIATE VERIFICATION OF AGREEMENTS REACHED, AND MEASURES ENSURING THAT SUCH AGREEMENTS WILL NOT BE CIRCUMVENTED OR UNDERMINED. (IN THIS CONNECTION, AS IN OTHERS, THE QUESTION OF HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT HUNGARY WILL BE INCLUDED IN FUTURE DECISIONS, AGREEMENTS AND MEASURES REMAINS TO BE EXAMINED AND DECIDED DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS.)

WITH REGARD TO STABILIZING MEASURES, MY COLLEAGUES AND I WISH TO TABLE THE FOLLOWING PROPOSALS RELATING TO ACTIVITIES OF SOVIET AND U.S. GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, ON WHICH WE WILL ADVANCE DETAILS AT AN APPROPRIATE POINT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS:

PRE-ANNOUNCEMENT OF MOVEMENTS OF U.S. AND SOVIET  
FORCES INTO THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, INCLUDING ROTATIONS;  
PRE-ANNOUNCEMENT OF MAJOR EXERCISES BY U.S. AND SOVIET

FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS;  
LIMITATIONS ON THE SIZE, NUMBER AND DURATION OF  
MAJOR EXERCISES BY U.S. AND SOVIET FORCES IN THE AREA OF  
REDUCTIONS; AND  
EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS AT MAJOR EXERCISES BY U.S. AND  
SOVIET FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS.

THIS LIST IS NOT EXHAUSTIVE AND WE MAY PROPOSE FURTHER  
MEASURES. APPROPRIATE STABILIZING MEASURES MUST BE AN INTEGRAL  
PART OF ANY REDUCTION AGREEMENT AND TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THAT THE  
SECURITY OF ALL THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS MUST NOT BE  
DIMINISHED.

MR. CHAIRMAN, THE CONCEPT OF A COMMON CEILING FOR GROUND  
FORCE MANPOWER ON EACH SIDE IN CENTRAL EUROPE IS AT THE CORE  
OF OUR PROPOSALS. IT IS LIKEWISE THE KEY TO OUR GENERAL  
APPROACH TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT MUTUAL  
REDUCTIONS OF GROUND FORCES, IN ORDER TO BE SAFE, EQUITABLE  
AND MANAGEABLE FOR EITHER SIDE, SHOULD BE DIRECTED TOWARDS  
THE CHIEVEMENT IN TWO PHASES OF THE GOAL OF SUCH A COMMON  
CEILING, WHICH MIGHT BE SET AT 700,000 SOLDIERS FOR EACH SIDE.

MY LUXEMBOURG COLLEAGUE EXPLAINED ON DEC 5 THE REASONS  
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FOR OUR PROPOSAL FOR TWO PHASES OF NEGOTIATIONS.  
TO BRING ABOUT A MORE GENUINELY STABLE MILITARY RELATIONSHIP  
IN CENTRAL EUROPE IS A GOAL WHICH ONE CANNOT HOPE TO ACHIEVE  
IN A SINGLE STEP. TO INCLUDE FROM THE OUTSET FORCES OF ALL  
NATIONALITIES IN THE INTERESTS OF "COMPREHENSIVENESS" WOULD  
ENTAIL ADDITIONAL COMPLEXITIES AND THUS DEFEAT ITS SUPPOSED  
PURPOSE OF ACHIEVING PRACTICABLE RESULTS.

TO REDUCE SOVIET AND U.S. GROUND FORCES IN A FIRST PHASE,  
AS WE HAVE PROPOSED, WOULD BE AN EMINENTLY PRACTICAL WAY TO  
PROCEED TOWARDS THE COMMON CEILING GOAL. ONCE ACHIEVED, AN  
AGREEMENT REDUCING SOVIET AND UNITED STATES FORCES WOULD  
FOSTER CONFIDENCE WHICH WOULD FACILITATE REDUCTIONS OF OTHER  
FORCES TOO.

MR. CHAIRMAN:

AS MY COLLEAGUES AND I HAVE ALREADY POINTED OUT, IT IS NOT  
OUR PURPOSE TO STOP AFTER ONE PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS. WE  
PROPOSE TO GO ON TO REACH THE OBJECTIVE OF A COMMON CEILING  
ON OVERALL GROUND FORCE MANPOWER ON EACH SIDE, TAKING INTO  
ACCOUNT COMBAT CAPABILITY. THIS IS WHY WE HAVE PROPOSED IN  
PARAGRAPH 10 OF OUR OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS THAT A FIRST-PHASE  
AGREEMENT WOULD INCLUDE AGREEMENT FOR CONTINUATION OF NEGOTIATIONS  
IN A SECOND PHASE.

THE SOVIET AND U.S. REDUCTIONS WHICH WE HAVE PROPOSED WOULD  
THUS BE AN IMPORTANT BUT ONLY A FIRST STEP TOWARDS REACHING  
SUCH A COMMON CEILING AND HENCE A MORE STABLE RELATIONSHIP  
BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. CLEARLY, GIVEN THE DISPARITY IN TOTALS  
OF GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA - THERE ARE ALMOST 150,000  
MORE SOLDIERS ON THE EASTERN SIDE THAN ON THE WESTERN SIDE -  
FURTHER REDUCTIONS WILL HAVE TO FOLLOW IF THE COMMON CEILING  
GOAL IS TO BE REACHED.

WE HAVE ACCORDINGLY PROPOSED THAT A REDUCTION OF GROUND  
FORCES REMAINING IN THE AREA AFTER FIRST-PHASE REDUCTIONS  
SHOULD BE NEGOTIATED IN A SECOND PHASE. THIS WOULD BE ENSURED  
IF A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT, GOVERNING THE REDUCTION OF U.S. AND  
SOVIET FORCES AND PROVIDING FOR APPROPRIATE ASSOCIATED MEASURES,  
INCLUDED AN AGREEMENT ON THE CONCEPT OF A COMMON CEILING AS  
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WELL AS ON THE CONTINUATION OF NEGOTIATIONS IN A SECOND PHASE.  
THE SECOND-PHASE AGREEMENT WOULD PROVIDE FOR COMPLETION OF  
THE MOVEMENT TOWARDS THE AGREED COMMON CEILING FOR OVERALL GROUND  
FORCE MANPOWER ON EACH SIDE. WE PROPOSE TO ACHIEVE THIS GOAL  
THROUGH INCLUDING THE GROUND FORCES OF OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS  
IN A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS TO TAKE PLACE AFTER A SATISFACTORY  
PHASE I AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED. THE PRECISE FORMULATION OF  
THE PROVISION IN A FIRST-PHASE AGREEMENT PROVIDING FOR A SECOND

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USIA-15 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 SS-20 NSC-10 H-03 IO-14 AEC-11

AECE-00 OMB-01 EB-11 /175 W

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P R 081728Z DEC 73  
FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 911  
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY  
INFO USMISSION NATO  
AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USNMR SHAPE  
USCINCEUR

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ANKARA FOR DELIVERY TO NATO DEPARTMENT TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTRY  
MBFR NEGOTIATIONS  
FROM US REP MBFR

PHASE OF NEGOTIATION, THUS LINKING THE TWO PHASES, CAN BE  
DISCUSSED AT AN APPROPRIATE POINT IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

THE POINT-BY-POINT EXAMINATION OF THE WESTERN PROPOSALS  
WHICH I HAVE JUST COMPLETED DEMONSTRATES THAT THEY CONTAIN  
THE ELEMENTS NECESSARY FOR A MUTUALLY ADVANTAGEOUS AGREEMENT.  
THEY PROVIDE FOR SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS IN TWO PHASES WHICH  
WOULD COPE WITH MAJOR PROBLEMS POSED BY DISPARITIES IN THE  
EXISTING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE GROUND FORCES OF THE TWO  
SIDES. THEY PROVIDE FOR APPROPRIATE ASSOCIATED MEASURES  
AND FOR THE UNDIMINISHED SECURITY OF FLANK COUNTRIES. THEY  
WOULD PRODUCE AN EQUITABLE RESULT. THE WESTERN PROPOSALS,  
FAR FROM DIMINISHING THE SECURITY OF EITHER SIDE OR OF ANY  
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PARTICIPANT, WOULD PROVIDE GREATER STABILITY FOR BOTH SIDES  
AND THUS MAKE A MAJOR IMPROVEMENT IN ERUOPEAN SECURITY.

IF WE HAVE CORRECTLY UNDERSTOOD REMARKS MADE BY EASTERN  
REPRESENTATIVES AT PREVIOUS PLENARY MEETINGS, THE EASTERN  
SIDE SHARES THE MOTIVE OF ENSURING TO ALL THE BENEFITS OF  
INCREASING SECURITY AND MUTUAL CONFIDENCE. THIS IS A HIGH AIM.  
BUT WE BELIEVE THAT IT CANNOT BE ACHIEVED SIMPLY BY  
PERPETUATING THE PRESENT RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES IN CENTRAL  
EUROPE.

IT HAS BEEN ARGUED THAT THE PRESENT MILITARY RELATIONSHIP  
SHOULD BE PRESERVED BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN SHAPED BY HISTORY.  
ON THE WESTERN SIDE WE CANNOT ACCEPT THAT THIS FORCE RELATIONSHIP  
IS SATISFACTORY IN TERMS OF STABILITY. THIS RELATIONSHIP CAME  
ABOUT IN A PERIOD CHARACTERIZED BY MUTUAL DISTRUST AND SEVERE  
TENSIONS IN EUROPE. TI IS THE RELIC OF A PAST WHICH WE  
ARE HERE TO OVERCOME. THAT CANNOT BE TAKEN AS A

SATISFACTORY FOUNDATION FOR THE PROMOTION OF ENHANCED STABILITY AND GREATER MUTUAL CONFIDENCE, WHICH BOTH SIDES IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS DESIRE AND WHICH OUR PROPOSALS ARE DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE.

NOT ONLY DO THE WESTERN PROPOSALS SET FORTH DESIRABLE GOALS, BUT THEY ARE ALSO PRACTICAL. EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN THAT THOSE ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS WHICH LIMIT THEMSELVES TO PRACTICAL AND ATTAINABLE RESULTS ARE MORE LIKELY TO SUCCEED THAN THOSE WHICH TAKE A COMPLICATED AND THERORETICAL APPROACH. IF BOTH SIDES ARE DEDICATED TO THE TASK OF DEMONSTRATING THEIR RESOLVE AND THEIR POLITICAL WILL BE SHOW PROGRESS IN A COMPLEX FIELD, IT WOULD APPEAR LOGICAL TO ADDRESS OURSELVES TO STRAIGHTFORWARD AND MEANINGFUL PROPOSALS. LET US DO SO. LET US BEGIN THE NEXT STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN A PRACTICAL AND DIRECT WAY BY DEALING WITH THE ISSUES OF THE FIRST PHASE. WITH THIS PURPOSE LET US ADDRESS THE GROUND FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE SOVIET UNION IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THIS IS THE APPROACH WHICH OFFERS THE BEST AND MOST DIRECT PATH TO AGREEMENT. END TEXT.HUMES

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## Message Attributes

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